Digital Communication Structures Spread Hate and Drive Polarization
The algorithmic structures and political economies of dominant commercial platforms favour emotive, attention-grabbing content, leading to an information environment in which hyperpartisan and hyperemotive content is prevalent. This information environment drives hate and exclusion, exascerbating societal division and polarisation.
India
The problem of disinformation and misinformation has been exacerbated by the closed nature of some private messaging platforms, where fact-checking and mitigation techniques become difficult to implement. Digital platforms are also regularly used to glorify vigilante violence, especially against minority groups.
The growth of social media usage for political campaigning is also a crucial factor driving this phenomenon. While the incumbent Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) party is often seen as the primary actor for political polarization and mis- and disinformation, other national political parties such as the Indian National Congress (INC) also promote polarizing content.
Read more in our report on the 2024 Indian Election.
Indonesia
Resentment, defined as the belief that out-groups unfairly benefit at the expense of in-groups, is examined across four dimensions in Indonesia: religious resentment toward Christians, ethnic resentment toward Chinese-Indonesians, resentment against Java’s dominance, and regional resentment tied to economic disparities, claim Soderbeg & Muhtadi (2023).
The investigation on how resentment shapes political polarization in Indonesia finds a strong link between resentful attitudes and support for Prabowo Subianto in the 2019 election, showing that Indonesia’s polarization stems from deep societal divides. While resentment toward Java’s political and demographic dominance has diminished over time, resentment targeting Chinese-Indonesians and non-Muslim minorities remains deeply entrenched. These sentiments are particularly pronounced among younger voters, whose political socialization increasingly occurs through social media.
Read more in our report on the 2024 Indonesia Election.
Pakistan
According to a report by the Digital Rights Foundation of Pakistan, during the 2024 national elections, a high level of harmful and hateful content was circulated across social media platforms in the run-up and during the election period. This included misogynist content targeting female politicians and journalists, in addition to threats of physical assaults, organized trolling campaigns, and gendered insults that were being promoted by some political parties and their supporters.
Read more in our report on the 2024 Pakistan Election.
Mozambique
Due to the lack of consistent active media presence in the province of Cabo Delgado, overran the violence, coupled with allegations of serious human rights violations from multiple belligerents, misinformation (such as exaggerated claims about the ethnic or religious motivations of the insurgency) were particularly sensitive and incendiary.
False claims about the scale of the violence, spread wildly by panicked communities, were swiftly condemned by the government. In terms of the political rhetoric surrounding the election, president nominee Venâncio Mondlane’s supporters thrived on social media by lambasting both the ruling party FRELIMO and the third biggest in the parliament RENAMO as FRENAMO (presenting them as two sides of the same coin to antagonize supporters of either). They also were appropriating the popular revolutionary songs and slogans of the independence movement.
Read more in our report on the 2024 Mozambique Election.
South Africa
Social media played a significant role in amplifying political polarization, particularly through the campaigns of populist leaders Julius Malema and Jacob Zuma. Malema’s posts frequently attacked the governing party ANC and white monopoly capital, framing political struggles in terms of racial and economic zero-sum battles. Similarly, the ANC used social media to discredit opposition parties, particularly focusing on the Democratic Alliance and its alleged ties to the country’s colonial past.
Popular anti-ANC hashtags that trended included #VoetsekANC and #VoetsekANC2024. The term Voetsek is a pejorative Afrikaans term that loosely translates to go away, attacking the ANC with racially loaded language.
Between January 1 and March 31, 2024, these hashtags were used approximately 111,000 times on X, with a peak of 9,186 mentions on February 24, 2024, coinciding with the ANC’s manifesto launch. The coordinated amplification of these hashtags was notably driven by accounts supporting the forth biggest and oppositional party EFF.
Read more in our report on the 2024 South Africa Election.
Georgia
Ruling party Georgian Dream oversaw systematic use of social media for computational propaganda. The have used official accounts as well as networks of unofficial supporters to spread the global war party conspiracy, claiming the European Union is provoking the Russian military and seeking to draw Georgia into the Ukraine conflict. They have also used digital media to spread conspiratorial claims of European liberal contagion, claiming support for progressive causes is the result of foreign influence, with populist rhetorical attacks on minority groups justified as the protection of Georgian values. Using these narratives, Georgian Dream sought to de-legitimize their political opponents as agents of the global war party and liberal contagion, casting them as enemies of the Georgian people.
The opposition, in turn, used their online presence to attack Georgian Dream’s politics as an alignment with Moscow, claiming the party to be pro-Russian agents of the Kremlin betraying the pro-European will of the Georgian people. The structures of social media, which favor promoting outrage and inflammatory content, saw these competing narratives dominate Georgian online discourse throughout the election. In this way, Georgian social media was highly polarised during the election between the two sides, which was so adversarial that neither side now recognizes the legitimacy of their opposition.
Read more in our report on the 2024 Georgia Election.
The United Kingdom
The rise of GB News and far-right influencers in the UK exemplifies how algorithmic structures and platform economies reward emotive, hyperpartisan content, driving societal division, often intertwined with traditional media. GB News, positioning itself as a counterweight to the BBC, has capitalized on the incentive structures of YouTube and Facebook by amplifying polarizing issues and segments on topics like asylum seekers or debates over trans rights often use sensationalist framing, designed to provoke strong reactions and steer the 24-hour media cycle.
Far-right influencers like Laurence Fox and Katie Hopkins further illustrate this dynamic; their content pushes anti-immigration rhetoric or critiques of multiculturalism designed to exploit existing grievances and fears, normalize adversarial and exclusionary views, and embed them in broader public discourse.
Read more in our report on the 2024 United Kingdom Election.
The United States
Donald Trump’s use of social media, particularly through platforms like X, amplified political polarization by spreading combative rhetoric and disinformation. His messaging often framed political battles as zero-sum, portraying any loss by his side as an existential threat to America, which further entrenched ideological divides. Elon Musk’s deregulation of the platform has meant that bots can easily post on X, prioritising freedom of information at a substantial cost for truth and transparency.
Kamala Harris’s 2024 presidential campaign shifted away from Joe Biden’s emphasis on unity and recovery, with dynamic, influencer-driven aimed at young people. This move was subsequently criticised for a lack of substance.
Read more in our report on the 2024 United States Election.
Mexico
The 2024 election in Mexico was a clear example of online polarization and the rapid spread of hate speech through digital communication platforms. Through both traditional and social media discourse, the Mexican electorate was polarized into two dominant camps around their support for former president López Obrador’s tenure, with little to no opportunity for civil discourse on platforms like Twitter and Facebook. Online commentators critical of Obrador and MORENA attacked their supporters as ignorant, stupid, and lazy; in return, those supportive of Obrador and MORENA labeled these critics as naive supporters of an elite-favoring system that will not benefit them.
Gender-based online hate speech was widespread throughout the campaign, affecting discussions at both the national and local levels. According to the electoral authority, 363 people were sanctioned for cases of gender violence (INE 2024). The suitability of both leading candidates for the presidency was questioned due to their gender. At several points, criticism directed at the candidates was perceived as gender-driven: Claudia Sheinbaum was accused of being a puppet of Lopez Obrador, while Clara Brugada, mayoral candidate for Mexico City, faced criticism linked to alleged sexual relations with a former political ally.
Although further research is needed to determine the causal effect of gender-based online hate speech on offline gender violence, we cannot discard an inflammable effect coming from online environments. For instance, in a local election, a female candidate was a victim of constant hate speech on Facebook. After filing a complaint for gender-based political violence, the electoral authority decided to nullify the election.
Read more in our report on the 2024 Mexico Election.